Abstract-This paper describes a system that is robust with respect to a sensor failure. The system utilizes multiple sensor inputs (three in this case) connected to a programmable device that averages the outputs from the sensors. The programmable device is programmed using evolvable hardware techniques. If one or more of the input sensors fail, then the controller detects the failure and initiates a reprogramming of the circuit. The system then continues to operate with a reduced number of sensors. The failure detection is accomplished by comparing the actual system output with a Kalman-filter estimate of the output. If the actual output and the filter estimate differ by an amount greater than the system uncertainty, then a failure is noted. The system is robust to several different failure modes: sensor fails as open circuit, sensor fails as short circuit, partial failures, multiple sensors fail, field programmable analog array input amplifier failure. This paper describes the experimental setup as well as results using actual temperature sensors. For all failure types, the system was able to recover to within 2% of the target value.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE GOAL of this paper is to develop a system that is resistant or tolerant of sensor failures, that is, fault tolerant. Fault tolerance is the ability of electrical components to continue to function despite failures (faults) in the hardware. The possible faults will be originally limited to failures in one of the sensors, but faults in other parts of the system [notably, one of the input amplifiers (IA)] will be considered. The result is a system that can suffer damage and recover without direct human intervention.
Our approach to the fault tolerance is based on the concepts of evolvable hardware (EHW). EHW is a new technique that has led to some radical new designs for analog and digital circuits [1] - [6] . EHW applies special algorithms called genetic algorithms (GAs) to hardware that consists of programmable elements. In EHW, a researcher specifies the desired output from the system, and then the GA "evolves" a circuit on the programmable device that gives the desired output.
This paper builds on several emerging concepts within EHW. The first concept is using EHW to provide fault-tolerant hardware. Other researchers have investigated the use of EHW techniques to provide robust hardware [7] - [10] . These systems, however, are different from the approach presented in this paper. Ortega and Tyrrell [7] do not use evolution as an adaptive repair mechanism. Keymeulen et al. [8] and Canham and Tyrrell [9] incorporate the fault tolerance into the design (training) of the hardware circuit. That is, they inject the known possible faults during the evolutionary process but do not address event changes (e.g., processor or sensor failure) or reprogramming. Zebulum et al. [10] address simulated faults only within the programmable device itself. The second concept is the application of EHW techniques to field programmable analog arrays (FPAAs). Evolvable techniques have had some success when applied to FPAAs [11] , [12] , but they were not used to develop fault-tolerant systems. The third concept is the use of reprogramming in EHW. EHW has previously been used to reprogram a system during operation [12] . However, the reprogramming described in [12] was due to a change in the mission of the system (e.g., a robot controller) rather than a failure in one of the components. This paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the overall approach and discusses the operation of the major components in the system. Section III describes the details of the experimental setup. Section IV gives the results from the laboratory experiments, and Section V lists the major conclusions.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

A. System Overview
The hardware setup incorporates N multiple (colocated) sensors instead of a single sensor in the electronic system. A processing system is then derived based on EHW principles to take the average of all N sensors as the system output. The next step is to let the system run indefinitely. For testing purposes, sensor failures are artificially introduced. The failure detection system utilizes a Kalman-filter-based algorithm to determine when one or more sensors have failed. Once a failure in the sensor is detected, the processing hardware is "redesigned" based on EHW principles to take the average of the remaining input sensors.
To provide sensor fault tolerance, multiple sensors must be included in the system to provide redundancy. The sensors could be any type (pressure, temperature, humidity, etc.) but for this paper temperature sensors were used. During implementation, all of the temperature sensors are located near or adjacent to each other so that they monitor the same value. In our experiments, all of the sensors are on a metal bar (high-thermal conductivity) that can be raised or lowered in temperature. The multiple sensor measurements are consolidated into a single measurement. Therefore, there is a circuit that does preprocessing on the sensor measurements. The goal is to derive a circuit that takes the average of N input sensors. (In our experiments N = 3). The preprocessing circuit is implemented on a FPAA. The output from each sensor circuit is a small voltage signal (on the order of a few millivolts) that will be input directly into the FPAA chip. Small voltage levels are not a problem since FPAAs have built-in amplifiers.
Utilizing multiple sensors has several benefits in addition to the fault tolerance. First, we note that incorporating multiple sensors leads to a final system output with a smaller uncertainty (as measured by the standard deviation) than if only a single sensor were used. Specifically, if the N sensors have identical characteristics, each with a measurement standard deviation of σ, then the standard deviation of the measurement average will be (1/ √ N ) * σ. Another secondary benefit of multiple, redundant sensors is the potential for graceful degradation. Adding multiple sensors and using a processor with configurable blocks will allow one (or two or more) modules to fail and yet there will still be a reasonable output. That is, instead of "step failure" as is common for many electrical components, there would be some warning before total failure as the individual processing blocks begin to fail.
B. Architecture of FPAA
FPAAs are a relatively new technology that is a spin off of the more well-known digital field programmable gate array (FPGA). For our experiments, we used the ispPAC30 from Lattice Semiconductor, which has programmable input and output amplifiers with programmable interconnects among the amplifiers. The architecture of the ispPAC30 is shown in Fig. 1 . The PAC30 contains four inputs, four input amplifiers (IAs), two output amplifiers (OA), two internal adjustable voltage references, and two multiplying digital-analog converters (MDACs). The IAs multiply their input by the gain setting; the gain can be set from −10 to +10. Two IAs, IA1 and IA4, are equipped with an analog multiplexor, so the gain for those two IAs can be effectively set to zero. The multiplying function on the MDAC means that the input is attenuated by a value corresponding to an 8-bit code. The attenuation can range from −1.0 to +0.9922. The output voltage of the ispPAC30 is limited to 0 V to +5 V.
The FPAA is chosen over other reconfigurable platforms such as the FPGA because it eliminates the need for multiple analog-to-digital (A/D) converters. With three input sensors, the overall system would require three A/Ds. With the FPAA, the analog outputs from the temperature sensors can be sent directly into the FPAA; if amplification is required, then the FPAA can be programmed to provide amplification. In many cases, the final (averaged) temperature measurement needs to be interfaced to a digital circuit, but then only a single A/D is required.
C. EHW Overview
EHW utilizes a GA to derive a hardware circuit. The standard GA [13] proceeds as follows: An initial population of individuals (possible solutions to the problem) is generated at random. In this paper, each solution in the population is string of bits. For every evolutionary step, known as a generation, the individuals in the current population are evaluated according to some predefined quality criterion called the fitness function. To form a new population (the next generation), individuals are selected according to their fitness; high-fitness ("good") individuals stand a better chance of "reproducing," while low-fitness ones are more likely to disappear. In our experiments, each member of the population was loaded onto the FPAA and the fitness was determined by how close the output of the circuit was to the desired output (see Section III-C).
Selection alone cannot introduce any new individuals into the population, i.e., it cannot find new points in the search space. New points are generated by genetically inspired operators-crossover and mutation. Crossover is performed between two selected individuals, called parents, by exchanging parts of their information (encodings) to form two new individuals, called offspring. In its simplest form, bits from one parent are exchanged for bits from the other parent. The mutation operator is introduced to prevent premature convergence to local optima; it is carried out by flipping bits at random with some (small) probability.
Applying evolutionary techniques to hardware design has led to many innovative designs in analog and digital circuits, and some fault tolerance arises just from the nature of the evolutionary process. The robust designs will "survive" and have a greater affect on future generations of designs than nonrobust designs [12] . Thus, the design derived using EHW principles could be more robust than a design based on conventional human expert techniques. EHW techniques also allow for autonomous reprogramming. Once a failure has been detected, the processing circuit needs to be reprogrammed to take the average of the remaining sensors. Since the goal is to have an autonomous operation, it is assumed that it is unknown which sensor has failed. Therefore, EHW techniques are applied to the now-damaged circuit.
D. Failure Detection
An important step is to reliably detect a sensor failure. The goal is to develop an algorithm that monitors only the FPAA output (the average of the N inputs) and detects when one of the input sensors fails. There are many competing priorities. One priority is the desire for a rapid failure detection. Another priority is insensitivity to noise (both measurement noise and process noise), because the failure detection triggers a circuit reprogramming, which may require several minutes. A third priority is an algorithm that is applicable for a wide variety of failures. A fourth priority is an algorithm that is not limited to a single sensor type so it is flexible enough to handle a variety of input voltages. Note that some of these priorities oppose each other. For example, one way to make the system robust to noise is to delay detection and average several output data points together but this is counter to the desire for rapid detection.
Two problems arise when designing a failure detection system that only looks at the average of N sensors. The first problem is that a complete failure in the sensor [say a short circuit (SC)] will only lead to, at best, a 1/N drop in the system output. Thus, a failure in one sensor will be masked by the other functioning sensors. A second problem is that the input circuit may be a Wheatstone bridge or other circuit. In this case, a complete failure in the sensor (e.g., an SC) will not necessarily lead to a 0 V input into the averaging system.
An input sensor can fail in many different ways or modes. Sensor fails but not as a complete open or SC. We decided to limit our failure detection algorithm to the failures of open, short, and possible partial failures, so dropout, gradual decay, and high noise were specifically excluded from the detection list. Single dropouts (perhaps due only to momentary interference with the sensor) do not represent a longterm failure of the sensor. One data output will be partially affected but the following data points will be unaffected. The gradual decay (or growth) failure mode will lead to an output that is indistinguishable from a gradual change in the environment, which is what is being measured. The only known way to detect a gradual failure would be to monitor each sensor individually. We did not include the high-noise failure (the sensor becomes very noisy) into our failure detection algorithm because 1) it does not change the overall average of the N sensors and 2) by averaging together N sensors, the standard deviation of the final output is only marginally affected by one noisy sensor.
Our algorithm detects a failure by comparing the actual system (FPAA) output with a Kalman-filter [14] estimate of the output [15] . If the actual output and the filter estimate differ by an amount greater than the system uncertainty, then a failure is detected. The predicted output, denoted by O est , is determined by computing an estimate for the next data point using a Kalman-filter update from the previous data point. The system uncertainty is determined by the sum of the process noise, given by a variancelike parameter Q, and the measurement noise, given by the parameter R. For our purposes, we used two similar parameters σ Q = √ Q and σ R = √ R so that the units are volts (and not V 2 ) and thus match with the measured quantities. If the FPAA output is denoted by O, then a failure is detected if
for two consecutive data points. In other words, if the actual output is different from the expected output by more than the total system uncertainty for two consecutive data points then we assume there is a failure. The two consecutive data points stipulation is added so that sensor failures of less than one sampling period do not trigger a reprogramming.
The parameters σ Q and σ R are dependent upon many factors: type of input circuit (e.g., Wheatstone bridge), number of input sensors, system gain, voltmeter accuracy, and quantization error. σ Q is the standard deviation of the process noise, which is found from the standard deviation of the resistors in our system (x), the gain factor G, the number of sensors n, and the input voltage V in . The variables used to represent the resistor values in the Wheatstone bridge are R 1 , R 2 , R 3 , and Rp, where Rp is the platinum resistance temperature detector (PRTD). This leads to
The standard deviation of the measurement noise is denoted by σ R . It can be found from the inaccuracy in the voltmeter plus the quantization error. If y represents the meter inaccuracy, z represents the output voltage of the system, and err q represents the quantization error, then
For our experimental setup, we derived σ Q = 0.012 V and σ R = 0.0246 V. These values of σ Q and σ R will detect any output change of approximately 10% or more. We note, however, that several different values for σ Q and σ R were tried during simulations and during some experiments and the failure detection system worked well. The performance of the algorithm, i.e., its ability to detect failure, was not sensitive to minor changes in the ratio between σ Q and σ R . In fact, one way to "tune" the performance of the failure detection system is to modify σ Q and σ R . See [15] for more background on the failure detection system. Qualitative results are shown in Fig. 2 . Fig. 2(a) is simulated data where the diamonds are (noisy) measurements that represent ten times the average of three sensors (output average = 0.4 V) and the line is the Kalman-filter output. One sensor fails as an OC so the output jumps. For two consecutive data points, the actual output (denoted by diamonds) minus the expected output (line) is greater than σ Q and σ R so a failure is noted. In Fig. 2(b) , a PRTD sensor has a single, momentary dropout. But since the output does not differ from the estimated for two consecutive data points, a failure is not noted.
The failure detection system was tested for several different types of failures: 1) one PRTD (out of three) fails as an OC, 2) one PRTD fails as an SC, 3) two PRTDs fail as OCs, 4) two PRTDs fail as SCs, 5) one PRTD fails as an OC and one PRTD fails as an SC, 6) one PRTD fails as a partial open (resistance increases by a factor of 10), and 7) one PRTD fails as a partial SC (resistance decreases by a factor of 10). Multiple runs were made with each type of failure. In all cases, the failure detection algorithm detected the sensor failure.
In traditional sensor fault tolerant systems, the processor receives inputs from all of the sensors. The sensor outputs are represented as connected intervals, which contain the physical value of interest [16] , [17] . The fault tolerant algorithm takes these intervals and gives the output as a connected interval representing the combined sensor value. These traditional fault [17] . In the method discussed in this paper, only one A/D is required, plus an FPAA and a processor running the Kalman-filter-based failure detection method. The GA is required only if a failure occurs.
III. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
A. Experimental System Overview
The overall system block diagram is shown in Fig. 3 . Multiple sensors are input into an FPAA that calculates the average of all the sensors. The failure detection algorithm and the GA are C programs that run on the controller (PC). The controller programs the FPAA by downloading a string of bits. A complete configuration of the PAC30 requires 112 bits. However, for our EHW experiments, we used a shorter bit string. The string length was 22 bits; this programming string evolved the gains on the three IAs, one MDAC, and the two on-board multiplexors. The interconnections within the FPAA were fixed. The cost of the system is approximately $200 for the FPAA evaluation board, three sensors ($38 each), and resistors for the sensor input circuits.
B. Sensor Input
Two different types of temperature sensors were considered. Thermocouples were evaluated but ultimately rejected. The main problem with thermocouples is that the voltage they produce at room temperature is very small (<1 mV) and at times would even be negative. Therefore, we chose to use PRTDs (100 Ω).
The PRTD is not a self-powered sensor. Therefore, each PRTD was inserted into one leg of a Wheatstone bridge circuit (see Fig. 3 ) to supply power to the PRTD. Initially, we used the same 5-V power supply that powers the FPAA chip to power a Wheatstone bridge circuit. However, this caused rather large (more than 10
• C) errors in the temperature measurement due to self-heating in the PRTD. To alleviate the self-heating problem, the Wheatstone bridge circuit was powered by 1 V.
The output of each input bridge circuit is on the order of 40 mV at room temperature. In all of the experiments, the output voltage of each of the three bridges was measured before the initial programming step. Ten times the average of the three voltages was used as the target value during initial programming. The three bridge outputs were routed to IA1, IA2, and IA4, respectively, on the FPAA. Failures were introduced to input 1 (for one failure) and inputs 1 and 4 (for two failures), since the gains of IA1 and IA4 could be set to zero.
C. Evolvable Algorithm Parameters
The evolvable algorithm used to program (and reprogram) the FPAA is a standard GA with crossover and mutation. The selection method is roulette wheel selection. The probability of crossover is 0.7 and the probability of mutation is 1/16. In general, for the 22-bit programming string, the population size was 30 and the number of generations was 30. Elitism was used in all of the experiments to insure that the fittest member of each generation is guaranteed a spot in the following generation.
Since the outputs of each of the PRTD Wheatstone bridge input circuits is small, around 0.04 V at room temperature, we decided to program the preprocessing circuit to have a gain of 10. The equation of the original fitness function was
where O is the output from the FPAA preprocessing circuit and O tar (= 10 * the average of sensor circuit voltage) is the target (desired) output from the FPAA. At room temperature, the target output is approximately 0.4 V. Fig. 4 shows the shape of the fitness function at room temperature. The peak value of the fitness function is 2 (at the target value) and the fitness quickly falls off as the actual FPAA output voltage gets further from the target value. The target value during reprogramming was set to the last known good data value. Thus, if the input average rose or fell due to changes in the environment, then the circuit would still be reprogrammed to the correct value even after sensor failure.
Note that the original fitness function put no limits or restrictions on the internal gains of the FPAA. Therefore, any combination of IA gains and MDAC gain that led to an output near the target output was equally valid to any other combination. This had the advantage of being simple and easy to program but had the disadvantage of leading to nonideal results. One specific disadvantage was that there were often unequal gains among the IAs. For example, the gain on one IA might be 10 and the other two would be 0 or 1 after the EHW programming step. To steer the programming toward a solution that had fairly equal gains among the IAs, extra terms were added to the fitness function. The fitness function was changed to
where IA1, IA2, and IA4 refer to the gains of the three IAs. Now there is a small penalty (a maximum of 10% of the peak value) if the amplifier gains are not all equal. Note that the maximum value of the fitness function is still 2, but the maximum occurs only if the actual output is equal to the target output and the gains of the IAs are all equal. The primary term in the fitness function is dictated by how close the circuit output is to the target output but adding the extra terms guides the solution toward one that has all equal IA gains.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A plot of the entire process is shown in Fig. 5 . The first ten data points show the FPAA output during the initial programming phase (one data point per every two generations). Initially, the output is not very close to the target output (O tar = 0.4472 V) but eventually it "evolves" to the correct output. Then, the system accurately responds to an environment change. A heater is turned on and the FPAA output (which averages the three sensors) rises. Note that a gradual rise, or fall, in temperature does not trigger the failure detection. After the system output has stabilized, one of the PRTDs is removed from the circuit creating an OC fault. In one of the more dramatic demonstrations, the sensor was hit with a hammer to induce a failure. The output voltage is off the chart. The failure detection algorithm registers a failure and initiates a reprogramming to the new target output value (O tar = 0.4734 V). Again, it takes a few generations to recover but then the output again recovers to within 2% of the target output.
Quantitative results are shown in Table I . Several different failures were introduced into the system. The table shows the original target voltage, the FPAA voltage after the original programming step (and the percent different from the target value), the gains on the IAs and the MDAC and the number of the generations it took to converge to the final output. The next row in the table shows the type of failure that was introduced, the new target voltage and then the FPAA setup after the reprogramming. The failures studied are one PRTD OC, one PRTD SC, two PRTDs fail as OCs, two PRTDs fail as SCs, one PRTD fails as an OC at the same as one PRTD fails as SC. In addition, we simulated an IA failure by short circuiting the inputs of the IA. In all cases, failures were introduced at either PRTD #1 (connected to IA1) or PRTD #3 (connected to IA4) since only those two IAs could be completely set to zero. Also, because of the Wheatstone bridge input circuit for each sensor, the bridge output is 0.5 V when the PRTD fails as OC and −0.5 V when the PRTD fails as an SC.
The important items to note in Table I are 1) how close together are the actual and target outputs during both the programming and reprogramming steps and 2) the physical configuration of the FPAA both before and after the sensor failure. In all cases, the original programming and reprogramming derived output voltages were within 2.6% of the target value, and half of the cases were within 1% of the target value. To compare physical configurations, look at the case where two PRTDs fail simultaneously as SCs. After the original programming, the gains on all three IAs were set to the maximum value of 10. The MDAC gain was 0.3359 so the FPAA output was indeed 10 times the average of the three sensors. Then, PRTDs 1 and 3 fail as SCs. After reprogramming, the gains on IA1 and IA4 were set to zero, thus eliminating PRTDs 1 and 3 from the final averaging operation. The gain on the MDAC was set to the maximum value of 0.9922. Thus, the final FPAA output is within 1% of the target output and is dependent solely on the only good sensor. The fault-tolerant system has recovered completely from a loss of all but one sensor. In another experiment (not shown in Table I ), two PRTDs were short circuited sequentially; that is, PRTD 1 was replaced with an SC, the system recovered, and then PRTD 3 was short circuited. After the first reprogramming, the circuit recovered to within 0.46% of the target output, and after the second reprogramming (using just one sensor) the circuit got to 2.0% of the target. Again, the system recovered from a loss of all but one sensor.
Several conclusions are apparent from Table I . First, in general, the reprogramming did not take longer than the initial programming. For the reprogramming step, we started with the previous best result (or previous best generation) as a starting point. For an operational system, we would like quick reprogramming to 1) minimize down time and 2) reduce errors due to environment change. Second, the gain on the faulty sensor was reduced to zero or set to a small value for each failure. Third, the system is able to recover from any off-chip faults and even some on-chip faults. The last row in Table I shows the results from a simulated IA failure (the input leads were shorted out leading to the IA output always being zero). The system was able to detect a fault and then reprogram. The only failure from which our system was not able to recover was total sensor failure. As long as one sensor was operational, the reprogramming step was successful.
If any failure causes the output to vary by more than the total system uncertainty, it will be detected and reprogramming will configure the device around this failure. Therefore, we speculate, but could not test, that if an isolated failure occurs within the chip itself that causes a fluctuation of the output voltage, then not only will the error be detected, but also the reprogramming step will be able to reconfigure the device around the error. Thus, only the inputs that remain unaffected will be used. If this is the case, then our temperature sensor system is not only tolerant to faults in the sensors, but also partial failures of the chip itself.
All of these results show that the system is adept at recovering from failures, which take place after the initial programming. However, one issue not discussed above is the situation in which an error occurs during programming. The success of the programming step when this type of failure occurs depends upon when the error takes place. If it occurs in the first few generations, the program is able to recover and program to an acceptable solution. However, if it occurs in a later generation, the initial programming programs the circuit to the wrong value. However, the failure detection algorithm immediately detects the error and initiates a reprogramming that correctly programs the circuit. Although the system is not able to detect this type of error the instant it occurs, it is able to recover from it.
V. CONCLUSION
We have developed a system that is robust or fault tolerant. It programs a circuit (embodied on an FPAA) to average N input sensors, where N is three for our experimental results. It detects a failure using a Kalman-filter approach, then reprograms the FPAA to take the average of the input sensors after failure.
The system is robust to several different failure modes: sensor fails as OC, sensor fails as SC, multiple sensors fail, partial failures within the sensors, and FPAA IA failure. The only input failure that the system cannot recover from is when all of the sensors fail. A gradual change in the input environment (e.g., the temperature increase) is expected and does not trigger a failure and a subsequent reprogramming.
